"If God is Good, then Why is There Evil in the World?"
or "Is God Mr. Glass?"

Everyday, somewhere in the world, young children die of malnutrition. Elsewhere, other children die in the crossfire of wars. Still more die from preventable disease. Everyday, the planet that we inhabit is awash with tragedy. In spite of this evidence, billions of humans believe there is an omnipotent, benevolent being controlling the universe. Are these people fools, who cannot see the logical impossibility of their claim? Or, is there some way that a benevolent God could have created a world rife with evil, pain, and suffering?

The problem of evil outlined by atheists has three parts: If there were a God, there would be no evil. There is evil. Therefore, there is no God. Obviously, there are many underlying assumptions to the argument. By using the term, "God", the atheist means an omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent being. In ordinary experience, to be benevolent, one must prevent evil, whenever possible. It stands to reason then, that if God were benevolent, He would do everything in His power to prevent evil. There are many different definitions of evil, however for the purposes of the argument at this point, a definition beyond the common sense understanding is unnecessary. Continuing, since God is all-powerful there should be no evil, which He could not prevent. It is apparent that there is, in fact, evil in the world. Therefore, according to the argument, God must not exist.

Theists claim that while God is all-powerful, even God cannot violate the rules of logic. If that is the case, that God cannot improve one aspect of our universe without creating a logical contradiction, then God’s omnipotent benevolence could still account for the world, as we perceive it. An attempt to create such an explanation for the evils of the universe in light of God’s goodness is known as a theodicy.

In David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Demea proposes that the reason that there is evil in the world is a divine mystery, which will not be revealed in this life. While it may be the case that it is impossible to explain the existence of evil in the world, it is the job of philosophers to attempt to do so. The mystery response may indeed be the only logical response of the theist to the argument from evil, but a true philosopher should not turn to the mystery response, unless all other lines of reasoning have failed, and the argument for the existence of benevolent God remains convincing. To take such a position without first considering other theodicies is a disservice to philosophic discourse.

There have been a variety of theodicies proposed, which rest upon the justified evil rule. The justified evil rule is not a theodicy itself, but it is utilized by theodicies to make an argument. It states that a moral being is justified in causing or allowing evil, if the evil is necessary for the creation of a greater good or to prevent a greater evil.

Critics object that since God is not bounded by physical necessity, He should be able to create the greatest good without creating any evil. If God exists then he could perhaps create a world, in which humans are unable to harm one another or to do evil at all. Thus the justified evil rule, if accepted, is insufficient for use as a theodicy. In order to explain why God has not created a world in which men either did not or could not do evil, the justified evil rule must be coupled with another rule or principle in order to function as a justification for the rejection of the argument from evil. It is for this reason that two theodicies are introduced: the free will theodicy and the soul-making theodicy.

The concept of free will holds that human beings ultimately have control over and responsibility for their actions. A large majority of ethical thought holds that in some form or another, humans do have at least partial self-determination and a core of creative decision. The free will theodicy further postulates that human self-determination is of such importance, that for its sake God allows humans to create the evil existent in the world. God created man so that man could freely serve God. In order for man to serve freely, it was necessary that man be actually able to choose either good or evil. In order for there to be truly free will, God had to allow man to choose whether or not to bring evil into the world. Obviously, man chose to do evil, but in order to work the greatest good, it was necessary to allow man to choose.

So far overlooked in the discussion of the problem of evil, have been evils that do not appear to be directly initiated by human activity. Natural disasters and disease have plague mankind for time immemorial. Yet, there is apparently no man whose choices are causing them to occur. Here, the Biblical perspective provides an interesting argument, that the choice of man’s distant ancestors to sin is the cause of all the suffering and pain of the world. While the prevailing scientific environment discounts attempts to take this claim literally, in the general, it does seem to provide some sort of defense against the argument from evil. Adam, the first man, was warned that disobeying God’s commandment would bring death into the world. If he freely chose to do so then, perhaps, God can escape responsibility for some of the evil of the world. Unfortunately for proponents of the free will theodicy, showing that Adam’s ability to choose was necessary and out of God’s control is difficult, if not impossible.

An important objection to the free will theodicy is the possibility that it puts too high a value on free will. If free will necessarily results in pain and evil, then perhaps free will is itself evil or at least morally neutral and not a greater good for which evil can be tolerated. Proponents of the free will theodicy respond that without free will, human beings would be no more than robots, whose love and praise would be worthless. Yet, the price of free will is great. For the sake of their free will, God allowed great despots and dictators to trample the rights of others. If, for example, God had restrained Hitler’s free will, then potentially millions of lives could have been spared. It seems counter-intuitive to argue that preserving Hitler’s free will was worth the enormous cost, especially since according to Biblical tradition, in the past God has frequently intervened to change the course of human events. Notably, God intervened during the Hebrew enslavement by the Egyptians and changed the heart of the Pharaoh to allow for the release of His people. It seems arbitrary, that God usually sees no reason to interfere with human choice, but sometimes does.

Furthermore, the precise nature of free will remains unclear. If the human decision making is a logical process then it should be deterministic, meaning that in the exact same circumstances the same result would follow. If given the same decision then for whatever myriad reasons, the same outcome will be reached by the mind. That is of course, counter to free will’s supposition of spontaneity of thought. If that is not the case and the soul’s thoughts and decisions are unpredictable then human behavior seems to be as indeterminate as a coin toss. It is just a trick of culpability that the coin inside the human heart is named responsible for its choices. That the existence of random forces outside of God’s control or predictive ability are greater goods worth any resulting evils is a highly questionable inference. To propose such a bold statement without greater evidence to the necessity and desirability of free will is improper.

To continue questioning the free will theodicy, it is not entirely clear how God’s omnipotence can be reconciled with the thought that there are some things over which God exerts no control. If a person were omnipotent, one of the things she could do would be to strip herself of power. In that manner, perhaps God has rescinded his authority over the human soul. However, God is said to be both all-powerful and all-knowing. God is the source of all that was and all that will be. Therefore, God is responsible for what is to come. Free will purports to partially take control from God and give it to man. Yet all of man’s actions are dependent on God’s condoning. For example, if there were an all-wise person, who could predict the outcome of any coin toss, he could not deny partial responsibility for the outcome of his tossing a coin. If our all-wise gambler knew the outcome of a toss was to be heads, when thrown as he intended to do, he could not deny that he played a part in creating the heads outcome. While he could not control the specific aerodynamics and timing, he knew what would result and could have prevented the outcome by not tossing the coin. Therefore, he is partly responsible for the consequence. So too, God, even if human will were out of His direct control, must shoulder partial responsibility for human action. Consider again that perhaps the all-wise gambler was aware that his dice would, by some quirk of probability, never throw tails unless heads was thrown first. Perhaps God is in a similar circumstance, and human free will is such that without first allowing evil, humans will never do good. With the choice of no universe, and thus no good, or some evil and some good, God chose to create the universe knowing of the evil in store. Unfortunately, this theory runs counter to theistic conception of man as being originally morally neutral before he first brought evil to the world. If man were morally neutral, then there is no reason to suppose that evil was an inevitable option, when one considers God’s omnipotence. It seems reasonable to believe that God could have made a world in which God could have made certain that only in times when God knew the outcome to be favorable would he allow free will to be exercised.

Given the many objections to the free will theodicy, which question both the necessity and the coherence of free will, it seems that the free will theodicy must be rejected and other possible theodicies examined, before finally resorting to either the mystery theodicy or accepting atheism. The soul-making theodicy purports to solve the problems of the free will theodicy and refute the argument of evil. The central principle on which the soul-making theodicy rests is that without some evil, there cannot be true good. Goodness must be contrasted with a lack of goodness, if it is to be distinguished. Furthermore, God is concerned primarily with creating people, whose souls truly prefer good to evil. If God made a world, in which people did no evil and suffered no pain, then any action they performed would not truly be good, it would only be mindless conformity. Such conformity shows neither strength of will or conviction of character, the hallmarks of truly good heart. God has designed the universe, such that in many cases evil can triumph over good. Evil, wisely done, is expedient and self-serving. In a planet full of strife, those who stand up to evil and do good, in spite of egoistic self-interest, do a far greater good than could be conceived of in a utopian world. It is only as struggle that good gains its greatest meaning.

Even if there must be some lack of goodness for a contrast to be drawn, it may seem that the world in which we live has evil far more than is necessary. The good produced by the world must be incredible in order to account for the wealth of ills prevailing upon the earth. The good of the world is incredible. Martyrs, saints, prophets have all shone brightly in the darkness. In lives, in which it is easy to focus on routine and ignore the cosmic, the truth has been vigorously pursued by more than a few intrepid individuals. These people are the good, for which God has tolerated all of the faults of the world.

The atheist could object that the suffering of animals cannot produce in them fortitude or courage. However, the soul-making champion has two rebuttals. First, the suffering of animals, like all other suffering, affords charitable humans the ability to render comfort, a great good. Second, pain is not itself evil. It is frequently assumed that pain and death are evils that must be remedied. This is not the case. Pain is the natural process by which the body is informed of its malfunction. It is unpleasant, because it must be. Pleasant pain would serve no function. It would be less humane for God to have created a world with pleasant pain. In such a world, injuries would mount rapidly and death would follow. If, in order to avoid the necessity of pain, God had made the world such that there could not be injury or death, then, by the very basis of the soul-making theodicy, life would be devoid of good. Death is also natural result of the physical laws of the universe. Death is not wrong or evil; it is merely a cessation of life. For a human to inflict needless pain or death on another creature is evil, but pain and death themselves are not. Moreover, to alleviate pain or to save from death is good. Many people go further and insist on the contrapositive, that happiness itself is good. Happiness is only good as it is caused to come into being by good actions and good motives.

Now the question arises in the conception of creation as soul-making, is God’s benevolence truly comparable to human benevolence? Can it be called benevolence at all? Yes, however due to God’s nature, He is not constrained in the same ways. For example, humans are prohibited from murdering, whereas God can morally take life at anytime of His choosing. The reason that God can do so is because God has created all men. As such, He has the right to give or take life as He pleases. In many other areas, God’s responsibilities and obligations are different, due to the difference between His nature and our own. Yet, God can still be regarded as benevolent in the human sense, because good itself is a reflection of His will.

At last, the atheist is thwarted in this attempt to conclusively disprove the existence of God. Of course, the theist has by no means been proven correct by this refutation of the argument from evil. All that was shown is that the notion of a benevolent God creating the world, which we inhabit, is not incoherent. The argument from evil’s assumption, that if there was a benevolent God then there would be no evil, has been shown false. Even a benevolent, omnipotent God must tolerate some evil to exist, in order that true good can exist. To create true good without allowing evil is impossible. In this manner, the default position of philosophy toward the existence of God, agnosticism, is shown to remain whole.